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Abstract—The ultra-dense small cell networks (SCNs) have
been regarded as a promising technology to solve the data
traffic explosion in future. However, the complicated relation-
ships among large scale users and cells practically demand a
cooperative grouping mechanism to account for the shortage of
resources in SCNs. Then, a group buying market mechanism
provides a win-win situation and an effective resource allocation
in the view of economics. With additional decision information
being provided, the context awareness enhances and improves
the group buying mechanism. In this article, we propose a
Context-Aware Group Buying (CAGB) mechanism to allocate
the resources in ultra-dense SCNs. The feasibility, necessity, and
effectiveness of CAGB are analyzed first. Then, we introduce the
group buying mechanism and some common context awareness.
The relationship between context awareness and group buying
is also analyzed. Some important technologies in SCNs are
discussed in the view of CAGB, such as load balancing, spec-
trum management, and cooperative caching. Then, the graphical
coalition formation games (CFGs) of CAGB are also presented
to match the complicated network topologies in SCNs. Two
CAGB-based use cases about spectrum market and cooperative
caching are presented. Finally, future research issues about
context awareness, grouping mechanism, and buying mechanism
are discussed.
Index Terms—Context awareness, group buying, small cell
networks, graphical coalition formation games.
I. INTRODUCTION
O
VER the past decade, the mobile communication devices
and mobile data traffic have experienced an explosive
growth, which exacerbates the spectrum shortage. In order
to solve this problem and accommodate the heavy traffic,
5G technologies have been proposed to achieve a thousand
times increase in throughput. As one of the most important
features and promising technologies, the hype dense small cell
networks (SCNs) [1] have drawn a lot of attention recently.
The ultra-dense property brings about the large number of
cells and users firstly. Compared with the traditional com-
munication systems, numerous players challenge the decision
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framework and learning algorithms in SCNs. The interactions
among users and cells are more complicated and difficult
to be modeled, such as in the spectrum market. Traditional
distributed decision framework without information exchange
and cooperation cannot handle the large scales situation well.
But the connections among users and cells are stronger,
especially for the closely deployed ones. These close con-
nections of users’ demands, contents, traffic or other aspects
are considered as context awareness. Also, these connections
require a cooperative mechanism to explore and use. Fur-
thermore, the existing studies mostly focused on one level’s
resource allocation, lacking of an overall consideration for
both of users and cells. Hence, a cooperative mechanism which
uses multiple dimension information and achieves a win-win
resource allocation is to be investigated.
In this article, a context-aware group buying (CAGB)
mechanism is proposed to meet the resource allocation in
ultra-dense small cell networks. Group buying is a traditional
cooperative economic behavior and has been widely employed
on the Internet, such as in eBay and Taobao. Reviewing some
existing technologies in ultra-dense SCNs, such as spectrum
resource allocation and management [2]–[5], and load balanc-
ing [6], [7], it can be seen that there are mainly three reasons
that make group buying employed in ultra-dense small cell
networks possible and effective:
• The hyper-dense deployment provides a probability that
we can seek the consistency of users’ demands from
the diversity. The products of traditional group buying
are always hot sales, which attract people to form a
group and buy them. This consistency or same demand
of buyers is the basic motivation of group buying. In
wireless communications, the spectrum, energy or other
resources are hot sales for user, equipment and cells. To
achieve these resources, players would like to unite and
form a group.
• The group mechanism can achieve a win-win in eco-
nomics. In traditional group buying, the common cost
of products is reduced or shared by a large number of
buyers. In this way, buyers get the products with lower
price and gain benefit. On the other hand, even though the
unit price is less, the final benefit of sellers still increases
due to the increasing number of buyers. Also, in wireless
communications, some common or basic costs can be
reduced and a win-win result motivates both sellers and
buyers to employ group buying mechanism.
• The group buying mechanism can improve the resource
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efficiency through uniting users together. In the grouping
mechanisms, distributed powers can be united as an
entirety and achieve something they could not when
separated. As a cooperation mechanism, users help each
other. And the group buying may inspire more potential
users through reducing common cost sometimes. More-
over, considering context awareness which provides extra
information and strategy dimension, the context-aware
group buying mechanism could be better.
Therefore, combining context-aware group buying and ultra-
dense networks together is feasible, and it would achieve better
performance in resource allocation.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The
origin and application of the group buying mechanism is
introduced and the context awareness of the SCNs is discussed
in Section II. The existing studies of CAGB for resource
allocation are reviewed and some technologies are investigated
in Section III. With these specific technologies, graphical
coalition formation games are presented in Section IV. In
Section V, two use cases of spectrum auction and cooperative
caching with the CAGB mechanism are presented. Finally,
future research issues and the conclusion are given.
II. CONTEXT-AWARE GROUP BUYING
A. Group Buying
Group buying is a traditional mechanism for sales promo-
tion, which shows a new life with Internet development. This
mechanism has become an important and necessary part of the
Internet economics with effective results. Almost all popular
e-shops have employed this mechanism to improve their sales.
The main advantage of group buying is to save the public cost
with a large number of participants. On one hand, the cost is
reduced and buyers can get a lower price. On the other hand,
although the price is less than the non-grouping situation, the
increasing number of buyers leads to a total increase in the
final benefit. In this way, group buying brings about a win-win
situation for both buyers and sellers.
There are already some researchers focusing on the group
buying mechanism. Some typical models of spectrum auction,
caching and load balancing about CAGB are shown in Fig. 1.
The group buying was first used in spectrum auction situations
[2], [4]. They [4] investigated an auction pricing problem to
achieve high benefit with keeping truthful property. Authors
in [2] focused on the low budget situations and proposed
a grouping rule to unite the low budget users. The low
budget users are united based on their traffic demand, in
order to increase the total budget and the final channel access
probability. Then, the group buying was extended to other
fields of small cell networks [6], [8]. Authors in [6] studied
the energy efficiency of SCNs under the energy market and an
ahead selling framework. A Stackerlberg game was modeled
with a group buying mechanism to balance the load between
cells’ energy resource and traffic demand. Our previous work
[8] studied a caching cost reduction problem and designed a
group buying mechanism to reduce the data caching cost based
on the content awareness.
Compared with the Internet situation, the group buying
in ultra-dense SCNs has some differences and also, the key
points, which should be considered if employed.
• The resource allocation is different from product sales.
The main purpose of CAGB in SCNs is to optimize
resource allocation and improve efficiency, instead of
achieving more sales. Also, resources cannot be mod-
eled into traditional products due to the heterogeneous,
dynamic, uncertain and open properties of wireless com-
munications.
• More complicated grouping mechanisms need to be
designed. When optimized objectives are not similar
specific products, users’ utilities, grouping rules and
results performance may be different. Then interaction
among players also needs to be considered and formu-
lated, which is totally different from traditional situations.
Sometimes, users will play the role of the leaders in
CAGB.
• A win-win result needs to be carefully designed. For the
simple traditional group buying, the final win-win result
is easy to achieve. While for the resource allocation, the
results cannot be guaranteed to be win-win due to the
redesigned group rules and complicated situations. The
benefit of grouping sometimes belongs to only the buyer
side while the sellers are ignored.
Most of the existing related work focused most attention on
the buying actions instead of grouping strategies. However, we
think that the group buying mechanism should go beyond its
naming “buying” and, extend to more generalized situations
with the core idea “grouping”. In our opinion, the context-
aware group buying is not only an economical benefit im-
provement tool, but also an important and efficient mechanism
for resource allocation. For ultra-dense SCNs, the resource
allocation and optimization with a large number of players
are the challenges. Cell deployment [9], spectrum management
[4], [5], energy efficiency [6], [10] and caching [8], [11] are
the active research fields. Besides spectrum management, other
fields are not related to the buying directly. However, the
cooperative optimization idea can still be used in all these
fields, especially when the distributed optimization has shown
its disadvantages in ultra-dense situations. To solve this prob-
lem, finding the corresponding context awareness, designing
the group forming rules and analyzing the performance are the
three important folds to improve resource efficiencies.
B. Context Awareness
Based on the above discussion, to combine the group buying
mechanism and resource allocation harmoniously, a context
awareness bridge which can provide additional information
and extend cooperation dimensions and strategy space is
needed. The context awareness means that users can sense
the environment and obtain the information, such as location
and traffic, achieve the information and improve their utilities
driven by these awareness. According to the contents and the
purpose, the context awareness can be classified into many
categories. Here are some typical awareness:
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Fig. 1: The context-aware group buying mechanism in SCNs and the relationship within CAGB.
• Location awareness. In ultra-dense SCNs, cells and users
are located closely in the hot spot area. Under this condi-
tion, some technologies can be realized, such as, device-
to-device communications and load balancing. The loca-
tion awareness is the most common among context aware-
ness and influences the interference, throughput, delay
and many other metrics in wireless communications.
• Content awareness. The content awareness is related to
the caching technology or content dissemination net-
works. For these situations, what users concern about or
focus on is very important for the service provider. With
the deep learning in big data, users’ favor or disfavor can
be learned from their traffic data. Then, a more targeted
service can be provided with better quality of service in
more effective ways.
• Demand awareness. The QoS metric is the ability that
system can provide, offer or guarantee for users. While,
the quality of experience (QoE) is a complicated metric
to evaluate service, including received service, user’s
environment influence, emotional state, and other issues.
In this article, users’ demand can be regarded as the
simplification of the QoE metrics, which is the traditional
QoS-level based on users’ specific requirement. It can be
bandwidth, throughput and other resource demand based
on the application-level experiences. Compared with the
traditional QoS metric, the demand reflects users’ need
more accurately. Driven by demand awareness, users’
quality of experience will be improved. The resources
can be allocated more effectively. On the other hand, the
resource is saved by accurate demand, and therefore the
saved part can serve more users.
• Energy awareness. Since the ultra-dense SCNs are devel-
oped recently, the large number of cells and users makes
energy efficiency prominent due to the environmental and
economic considerations. Cell sleep mode and energy
harvesting technologies are proposed to save energy and
achieve energy efficiency.
• Social awareness. Social aware networks have drawn a
lot of attention recently. Besides physical interference
and connection, users have more complicated social re-
lationship. For example, two users may be friends and
they would help each other through providing relay, extra
spectrum resource and so on. Social awareness provides
a social presentation of network topology.
Note that for almost all context-aware group buying, no mat-
ter with direct cooperation or indirect distributed coordination,
a grouping mechanism is the key to design utilities and im-
prove performance in both the user level and the network level.
Imagining the following situation, if only one user is driven
by its context awareness, such as demand, and others are just
focusing on their throughput, the final result will not be better.
Players need to unite and work together based on the context
awareness. The relationship between context awareness and
the group buying mechanism is given as follows, shown in
Fig. 1(d): (i) context awareness provides extra information
dimension and strategy space, and (ii) group buying enhances
the context awareness through unity and aggregation. The
context awareness and group buying complement each other
and the combination contributes to the resource allocation in
SCNs.
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III. SCN RESOURCE ALLOCATION WITH CAGB
In this section, we focus on some existing technologies in
ultra-dense SCNs and try to find the connection with context-
aware group buying, summarized as in Table I.
A. Spectrum Market
The main purpose of small cell networks is to provide
higher channel rate and improve spectrum efficiency through
dense deployment. With the increasing traffic demands and
users, the spectrum resource is showing shortage. Compared
with the traditional static and fixed management and dynamic
open cognitive radio, the spectrum market mechanism assigns
resource based on users’ price. It keeps a dynamic and eco-
nomical assignment and, avoids the disorder caused by random
access. Hence, the spectrum market summarizes advantages
from the traditional and cognitive radio management, and
achieves effective results.
The CAGB has been used in some categories of spectrum
market, such as auction [2]–[4]. In these cases, users may
group to increase the access probability through aggregating
their budgets and reduce the cost through making full use
of the spectrum. Among these research, the most common
awareness is demand awareness. The economical evaluation
of spectrum resource is not only related to communication
metrics but also to demands and budgets. The demand aware-
ness is also the key point during the shifting from quality of
service to quality of experience.
B. Load Balancing
Since the traffic does not distribute uniformly, the cell
resource cannot always match the traffic demand. There always
comes the situation where one cell is overloaded but the nearby
cells still have extra resource. Load balancing [7] is proposed
to solve this problem by balancing the traffic and the demand
among cells. Some other technologies also employ the same
idea with different purposes. For example, sleep mode [13]
focuses on the energy efficiency and would like to shut down
some cells. In this way, the energy is saved by closing a cell
and its original users are still served well by nearby cells.
In these technologies, there are two levels for grouping: cell
level and user level. Nearby cells can form the coalition, and
balance the traffic with less cost. On the other hand, users can
play together and select cells to achieve better service. How
to balance the load effectively and satisfy quality of service
constraints is a key point in modeling. Naturally, almost all
the work considers about the location awareness. The Poission
point process is used to model the distribution of users and
cells. Besides, the energy and demand awareness also influence
cells’ strategies and users’ selections.
C. Caching
Users may have similar traffic demand in SCNs, especially
for popular contents. Compared with downloading the same
traffic from macro base station every time when users require,
the small cells would cache the traffic ahead and provide a
better service when users need it. On one hand, the spectrum
resource of the repeatedly requested data is saved for other
demand. On the other hand, the cached content is delivered
directly to users in a more timely manner.
Considering the distance issue, downloading cost from
nearby cells might be less than that from macro base station.
Since the caching capacity is limited, small cells can reduce
the caching cost and improve the spectrum efficiency through
cooperative caching [8], [11]. There are some work also
extending the caching from cell level to user level. Users form
groups, share the traffic through device-to-device communica-
tions. Obviously, the related awareness is content awareness,
which is key to model the caching cost and design grouping
rules.
There are some other technologies in ultra-dense SCNs
related to the CAGB mechanism, for example, the hyper-
graph interference management. Due to the fact that traditional
binary model cannot describe the summary effect caused by
ultra-dense deployment, the hyper-graph model is used to
present a more generalized and accurate interference relation-
ship. The users in groups represent hyper-edges and make
decision to avoid interference.
Note that the users, small cells and macro base stations have
different demands and requirement. Their focus points are also
heterogeneous. The corresponding mechanism and algorithm
should balance these conflicting goals. The context awareness
discussed before is not only about users but also about cells.
For example, energy awareness is an important aspect in
offloading and servicing macro users for cell consideration.
Content awareness is more common for cells’ caching issues,
which can help cells reduce much resource and improve
efficiency. In deployment problems, location cannot be avoided
and ignored. Other context awareness also plays important
roles when we consider different aspects of the hyper-dense
small cell networks. Besides the context awareness, the re-
lationship between users and different cells are complicated.
The simple coalition formation rules can contain much com-
plicated relationship, that is hard to describe or formulate.
No matter it is cooperative or competitive, coalitional or
selfish, with careful utility design and preference order choice,
the relationship can be shifted to the coalition formation
process. Some previous studies and research investigated the
existence of the stable coalition partition and achieved good
properties. For example, the Pareto order [14] can guarantee
the existence of the stable coalition partition in systems with
finite states. Based on these studies, the context-aware group
buying mechanism can makes the complicated relationship
between users and cells simple, in some degree and aspects,
fortunately.
IV. GRAPHICAL COALITION FORMATION GAMES FOR
CONTEXT-AWARE GROUP BUYING
To employ CAGB in SCNs, a group is needed first. There
are many theoretic models related to the cooperation mech-
anism. Among these models, the coalition formation games
are just studying the problems about which users should be
cooperated with and the existence of coalition structure. In this
section, graphical coalition formation games are introduced to
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TABLE I: Resource allocation in SCNs
Situations Literature Context Awareness Strategy Models
Spectrum Management
[3] Location + Traffic Channel Spectrum auction + overlapping coalition formation
[2] Demand Coalition selection Spectrum auction + coalition formation
[5] Location + Demand Payoff Two-side market
[12] Location Channel Interference management + Overlapping coalition games
Load Balancing
[6] Traffic + Energy Energy Energy efficiency + Stackelberg game
[7] Content User association Spectrum auction + coalition formation
[13] Energy Sleep mode Local cooperative game
Caching
[8] Content Caching source Local cooperative game
[11] Content Caching source Cooperative hierarchical framework
Deployment [9] Location + Energy Location deployment Convex optimization
1 3
2
4
6
5
(b) Graphical CFGs
1 3
2
4
6
5
(a) Traditional CFGs
1 3
2
4
6
5
(c) Local cooperative games
 Topology Coalition
Fig. 2: Example of tradition CFGs, graphical CFGs and
local cooperative games.(Users are all connective to each other in
traditional CFGs (a),while the graphical CFGs consider a topology
(b). The users in local cooperative games (c) consider all neighbors
and its own rewards as utility.)
match the resource allocation in SCNs. Then, some differences
between theoretical game models and practical communication
systems are discussed.
A. Graphical CFGs for CAGB
The coalition formation games [12], [14] study the existence
of stable coalition structure. In most CFGs, how to divide
the coalition benefit is determined and just focus on the
coalition structure. In other words, players’ utilities are only
related to the joining in or leaving action and there is no
bargaining between players among the coalition. This property
ensures the coalition formation is more available for some
certain strategy situations, such as dynamic spectrum access in
spectrum management and user association in load balancing.
Compared with the traditional CFGs, some important dif-
ference in SCNs are the location and topology. Due to channel
fading, users can only connect to nearby cells and users, which
limits their coalition selections. Furthermore, utility functions
may be related to the network topology, which is also different
from the traditional CFGs. The graphical CFGs can model
the resource allocation problem in SCNs more accurately
while considering the location awareness. An example of the
traditional and graphical CFGs is shown in Fig. 2 (a, b).
To match graph in SCNs, measures should be taken from
three key points in graphical CFGs: utility function, preference
order and coalition actions. The utility function is the objective
of players and should be carefully designed first. To evaluate
and formulate the influence of topology to users’ utilities is
necessary and important. Some methods in coalition games
and graphical theory may make contribution. Through utilities,
preference order can be defined as a selection between two
coalitions. According to the preference order, two actions,
joining and leaving, determine the merge rule and the split
rule of coalition structure. Two coalitions can merge into
a larger one when all users achieve benefit from merging.
Also, one large coalition can be split into two parts when the
divided parts can improve utilities from splitting. The existence
of the stable coalition partition is analyzed finally, which is
influenced by the utility function and preference order. These
actions influence the convergence and the performance of the
final results.
There are three key points in the design of CAGB in SCNs:
utility function, preference order and coalition action. After
introducing the basic definitions, we would discuss how to
couple with these challenges.
• Utility function. The most challenge in the design of
utility function is that how to describe system accurately
and provide convergence for proof at the same time.
Especially, for the graphical CFGs, the influence of
network topology is difficult to formulate in the functions.
As a possible way, we can combine the CFGs with
other game together, keeping the framework as CFG and
utility design as the other games, gathering advantages
together to tackle with difficulties. For example, the
local cooperative games (LCGs) [15] (in Fig. 2 (c)) as
a kind of potential game can offer much help. First,
the utility in LCG has a generalized guarantee for NE
existence, which provides a large degree of freedom in
design. Under this perfect condition, we can consider and
formulate the complicated context-aware factors in utility
functions, then modify it to couple with LCG utility types
for convergence. Secondly, the LCGs can use just local
information to achieve the global optimization, which
indicates a good adaption for graphical topology and
incomplete information situations. With this property, the
topology influence can be coupled with and the final per-
formance would have an improvement. Generally, the two
properties provide the design convenience, performance
guarantee and convergence proof to make the graphical
CFGs work. Some other games, such as matching game,
Stackelberg game also can be learned from and combined
with CFGs.
• Preference order. The Pareto order is a common pref-
erence order and widely used with a generally good but
not optimal performance. Beyond the Pareto order, to pro-
pose new orders achieving better performance is another
challenge. For example, coalition order maximizing the
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joint coalition’s utility, and selfish order maximizing its
own utility without damaging the other mates’ utilities in
the joint coalition are two new orders. They can describe
users’ behavior with different objectives or types and
achieve better performance than Pareto order. However,
without the Pareto order’s guarantying, the existence of
the final stable coalition partition needs to be proved.
The proof is also related to the utility design and some
kinds of utilities can provide some insight. For example,
the marginal utility, which can be used to describe the
coalition utility changes when new users are joining in,
has a good adaption for generalized utility formulation
and may suit for the coalition order. For the selfish order,
some traditional Nash game model can offer some help,
due to the similar selfish property in two cases.
• Coalition action. Traditional coalition action includes
mainly two actions: joining and leaving. Based on these
two actions, a swap action is defined as a two-phase
action with leaving and joining. Each of the phases should
obey the preference order. This requirement keeps the
stablity but may not limit the final performance. For
example, under the Pareto order, if the leaving would
damage other coalition mates’ utilities, this behavior
would not happen even if the new comer brings a higher
benefit. Furthermore, the current swap action considers
only one-to-one case, the many-to-many swap mechanism
is seldom investigated due to the convergence problem.
As the final results under many-to-many action are similar
to the Strong Nash equilibrium, it can also provide some
help in the proof. To say the least, the new action
may also improve the final performance as a heuristic
algorithm.
B. Gaps Between Game Models and Communication Systems
While game models provide some methods to allocate
resources in SCNs, there are still some gaps between the
theoretical game models and the practical communication
systems.
The first gap is the information limit. In many game
models, the information is assumed to be perfect. The players’
strategies, utilities, actions and rewards are easy to get. Then, it
is assumed that there are no errors and no delay among these
information transmission. However, due to the openness of
wireless communication, such information cannot be transmit-
ted without errors. Also, when one player changes its action,
the changes cannot be announced to the others immediately.
Hence, incomplete and uncertain information is more practical,
which brings about difficulties in game model.
Another challenge is the mechanism differences, especially
for dynamic factor. Dynamics influences many aspects in
communication. Players can move around and their locations
are dynamic, which may change the topology of network. For
example, the coalition structure cannot be maintained for a
long period. The traffic load, channel quality, and other micro
dynamics are also varying with time, influencing the utility
evaluation. The influence of micro dynamics can be alleviated
with utility function design. But for the macro dynamics, some
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Fig. 3: Spectrum utilization comparison of CAGB algorithm
and others in spectrum auction.
new mechanism or framework need to be proposed to account
for the changes.
The final problem is the achieved performance. The game
models only provide existence of final equilibriums and the
corresponding theoretical analysis. How to approach a better
equilibrium of the possible results is still not solved. For
the existing learning algorithms, modification is necessary to
match system and utility, and the convergence also needs to
be proved. Furthermore, considering the above two issues, the
learning algorithms are more difficult to design and modify.
V. CASE STUDY
In order to motivate the readers, we now present two use
cases of context-aware group buying: (1) spectrum auction
in [3] and (2) cooperative caching, which are related to the
situations of Fig. 1 (a) and (b), respectively.
A. Case 1: Spectrum Auction
Spectrum auction is one of the most effective solutions to
allocate the spectrum resource, but most of the existing studies
assume that the spectrum buyers’ demands are homogeneous
and the interference relationship is fixed without any change
with the variation of spectrum. In this case [3], we combine
the overlapping coalition formation with the double auction,
jointly considering heterogeneous spectrum reusability, multi-
spectrum demand and economical efficiency. We maximize
the buyers’ benefits and sellers’ benefits through the double
auction mechanism. Fig. 3 shows the channel selling ratio
of different algorithms, which also can be considered as
the spectrum efficiency in the system. To search for the
optimal coalition structure (i.e., buyer group formation), we
present a dynamic and iterative coalition formation algorithm
to jointly consider spectrum allocation and pricing rather than
separately. Pareto improvement of every coalition operation
in the coalitional formation process can make the algorithm
finally converge to a stable and satisfactory coalition structure.
Fig. 3 shows the comparison of spectrum utilization and
average buyers’ satisfactory levels. The CAGB algorithm is
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Fig. 4: The comparison of caching cost with different orders
in CAGB and non CAGB situations.
proposed in [3] and compared with an existing algorithm
and a random solution. The existing algorithm is a truthful
double auction for multi-demand heterogeneous spectrum.
But it ignores the economic efficiency of the final outcome
and just allocates the spectrum for conflict-free buyers in a
relatively simple way. Compared with it, we jointly consider
the heterogeneous demand, spectrum reusability and economic
efficiency in the design of our scheme in [3]. We can see that
the spectrum utilization and buyers’ satisfactory level rise with
the increase of the number of buyers. Note that the channel
selling ratio (spectrum utilization) is the winning ratio of the
whole coalitions. The proposed CAGB algorithm achieves the
best performance among the three algorithms.
B. Case 2: Cooperative Caching
In this case, we study the cooperative caching of small cell
networks. We assume that cells have similar contents to cache.
Hence, it is better to download the data in groups instead
of downloading alone. We focused on users’ data cost of
downloading from the base station and sharing among the
group. We formulated the downloading cost as a Shapley
value based on the content awareness of the group data
distribution. And the sharing cost is related to the topology
within the formed group. The group buying problem with
reducing cost is modeled as a coalition formation game. A
coalitional order maximizing the coalition benefit, and a selfish
order maximizing single user benefit are both proposed. The
existence of the stable coalition partitions is also proved in
both proposed orders.
The caching cost of users are compared with different orders
in Fig. 4. A non-group buying situation is also simulated for
comparison. The three orders, Pareto order, coalition order and
selfish order, are simulated under the CAGB mechanism. From
the figure, the three CAGB orders are all better than the non-
CAGB situation. The coalition order and selfish order achieve
less cost than the Pareto order.
VI. FUTURE RESEARCH AND CONCLUSION
A. Future Research
Based on the discussion presented in this article, some fu-
ture work can be focused on the three folds: context awareness,
group framework, and buying mechanism.
• Enrich and make use of the context awareness widely and
deeply. Some other context awareness need to be studied,
such as mobility awareness and energy awareness. While
the mobility brings about some problems, it also provides
another dimension of strategy. Users can move around to
join groups, reduce interference and seek for other users’
help, to achieve better performance. Furthermore, we can
dig the context awareness with a way of big data and
deep learning. Abstracting the information to knowledge
will contribute to the group buying mechanism to achieve
higher performance.
• Study a stable and rapid grouping mechanism to match
dynamics. The dynamics is one of the most difficult
issues in modeling practical systems. The existing works
about group formation are most about static situations.
However, users have dynamic traffic demand and they are
moving. The different dynamics influences the coalition
utilities and structure. This requires us to design a rapid
and stable coalition formation mechanism to match users’
dynamics.
• Extend buying mechanism to stereo situations. There are
different selling metohds in economics, such as bargain-
ing, pricing and auction. Besides auction, other methods
can also be used in group buying mechanisms. The
bargaining can model the coalition benefit division among
users. Sellers and buyers may use pricing mechanism
to compete for more benefit. Besides spectrum resource,
energy is yet another potential resource in group buying.
A joint spectrum and energy market can be studied in
load balancing.
B. Conclusion
In this article, we proposed and discussed a context-aware
group buying mechanism for resource allocation in ultra-dense
SCNs. Based on the large number of players and proximity
location with ultra-dense property, the feasibility, necessity
and effectiveness for CAGB mechanism are discussed. A
detailed introduction about group buying mechanism is given
and some key points of CAGB are presented. Then, some
common context awareness are introduced, for example loca-
tion, demand and content awareness. The relationship between
context awareness and group buying are also discussed. Load
balancing, spectrum management and cooperative caching are
reviewed in view of CAGB. Graphical coalition formation
games are presented to model the CAGB. Moreover, one
spectrum auction case and one cooperative caching case, both
with CAGB, are investigated. Finally, some future research of
context awareness, group framework and buying mechanism
in CAGB are presented.
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